🪥 Your Toothbrush Is Vulnerable: What Microcontroller Hacks Tell Us About Supply Chain Trust
Let’s talk about toothbrushes. Not the bristly kind you used in 1998—I'm talking about the “smart” kind. The one that syncs with your phone, tracks your brushing habits, and maybe even rewards you for flossing. Sounds harmless, right?
Until you realize that toothbrush may be running a microcontroller with firmware nobody’s ever audited, connecting via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) with zero authentication, and built using parts from a supply chain that spans four countries and three anonymous vendors.
And that toothbrush? It might be the weakest link in your personal security.
🤖 What’s Actually Inside These “Smart” Gadgets?
Microcontrollers (MCUs) are tiny computers embedded in everything from smart fridges to electric scooters—and yes, toothbrushes. They run firmware that controls behavior, communications, and sometimes even network access.
The problem is that most firmware running on these microcontrollers is:
- 📦 Proprietary and undocumented
- 🕳️ Rarely audited
- 🚫 Seldom updated
Popular chips like the ESP32, STM32, Arduino-compatible MCUs, and Raspberry Pi Pico are inexpensive, easy to integrate, and widely used in both hobbyist projects and commercial products. Many of these now include built-in Wi-Fi or Bluetooth connectivity—great for features, but also a major security liability if misconfigured or unpatched. However, their flexibility comes with risks. Many of these devices ship with:
- 🧩 Unlocked debug ports (UART/SWD)
- 🔄 Unsigned firmware updates
- 📶 Over-the-air (OTA) update functions with no authentication
- 🔐 Hardcoded credentials or undocumented backdoors
If this sounds like a hacker’s dream, that’s because it is.
🕵️♂️ How Could Anyone Hack a Toothbrush?
Let’s be clear: no one’s targeting your toothbrush for your dental data (probably). But attackers are interested in turning seemingly innocuous devices into entry points, bot participants, or launching pads for broader attacks.
Here’s how it happens:
- 📦 Compromised firmware
- 📡 BLE hijacking
- 🧃 Side-channel attacks
- 🔌 Debug interface abuse
These vulnerabilities are not just theoretical. In 2024 Trend Micro identified an IoT Botnet linked DDOS attack that comprises malware variants derived from Mirai and Bashlite and infects IoT devices by exploiting vulnerabilities and weak credentials
A study titled "A Study on Hardware Attacks against Microcontrollers" by Fraunhofer AISEC (German Federal Office for Information Services) highlights that many MCUs in common use (like STM32, Atmel, and others) lack modern protections against physical and fault injection attacks.
Read the PDF →
In 2023, a viral (though overblown) story alleged that 3 million compromised smart toothbrushes were used in a botnet DDoS attack.
Debunked by ZDNet →
🧬 The Real Problem: You Don’t Know What’s Inside
Your toothbrush—or your camera, or your smart scale—might look simple. But it likely contains components from dozens of different suppliers, each shipping chips, SDKs, or modules with their own firmware baked in.
In many cases:
-
The original firmware is never reviewed by the device brand.
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White-label vendors reuse SDKs across devices (a BLE toothbrush may share code with a smart kettle).
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There’s no formal software bill of materials (SBOM)—no way to know what’s in there, or what it's communicating with.
This is a supply chain problem, and it’s not limited to toothbrushes. It’s just easier to ignore when the device is small, inexpensive, and not connected to a critical network.
🔐 The Hidden Hands in Your Firmware
Backdoors aren’t always the result of cyberattacks—sometimes, they’re built in by the manufacturers themselves.
Whether for debugging, factory reset, over-the-air maintenance, or regulatory compliance, many consumer microcontrollers include:
- 🧩 Hardcoded admin credentials
- 🔌 Always-on UART/SWD debug interfaces
- 📶 Test modes accessible via Bluetooth or NFC
- 📡 Hidden access scripts built into preconfigured URLs
- 🧃 “God mode” serial commands with no authentication
Researchers have found backdoors in everything from light bulbs to baby monitors. In one case, a popular IoT camera brand included a remote firmware backchannel that let the vendor silently push code to customer devices—without any user interaction. In 2024 some popular D-Link Routers were found to contain a backdoor that enable Telnet
While not always intentionally malicious, these features often go undocumented and unprotected, leaving critical pathways open to attackers.
Insecure by design is still insecure. And when the attacker is using the same debug port as the factory tech, it’s already too late.
🔧 Physical-Level Threats to Microcontrollers
The Fraunhofer study outlines attacks like:
🔌 Read-Out Protection Bypass: Attackers use race conditions or power faults to dump protected memory—even when protections are enabled. STM32L4 chips, for example, were shown to be vulnerable to this via electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI).
🧨 Laser and Electromagnetic Fault Injection (LFI/EMFI): These techniques disrupt chip execution using physical pulses, often skipping critical instructions like authentication or flash erasure. No software bugs are required—just physical access and low-cost tools.
📡 Power and EM Side-Channel Attacks: Cryptographic keys can be extracted by monitoring a device’s power consumption or EM emissions during encryption routines. STM32F0 series MCUs have been successfully compromised using as few as 10 power traces.
🧠 Control Flow Skipping: Glitching attacks can skip over conditional checks—bypassing secure boot or password gates entirely.
🧵 Execute-Only Memory Bypass: Even protections like XOM (execute-only memory) can be defeated through indirect memory access using CPU register manipulation and SRAM exposure.
These aren’t just academic attacks—they’re achievable with tools like ChipWhisperer or custom glitchers, often for under $500.
Adding these threats to your threat model—especially for products shipping in large volumes or with sensitive data—is essential to long-term security planning.
🔐 What Should Be Done?
There’s no silver bullet, but practical steps can be taken by manufacturers and regulators:
✅ Signed firmware – Require cryptographic verification before updates are applied
✅ Secure boot – Lock devices into trusted firmware at boot time
✅ SBOMs for embedded devices – Know what’s in your code and who wrote it
✅ Vulnerability disclosure programs – Create a legal path for ethical hackers to report flaws
✅ IoT security standards & labeling laws – Like the UK’s PSTI Act or the U.S. Cyber Trust Mark
A 2022 academic paper on IoT security frameworks emphasized the lack of standardization and enforcement, urging governments to push stronger baseline requirements for consumer electronics Taylor & Francis IoT Security Frameworks and the Case for Regulation.
For hobbyists, penetration testers, and engineers in this space: tools like Flipper Zero, Bus Pirate, and open-source disassemblers are crucial for reverse-engineering devices and showing just how fragile the security posture is.
🌐 Existing and Emerging IoT Security Regulations
🇺🇸 United States
IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020: Enacted on December 4, 2020, this federal law mandates that IoT devices procured by the U.S. government meet minimum cybersecurity standards developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). These standards focus on aspects like access control, incident response, and system protection. Congress.gov | Library of Congress ->
California Senate Bill No. 327 (SB-327): Effective January 1, 2020, SB-327 requires manufacturers of connected devices sold in California to equip them with reasonable security features appropriate to the device's function and the information it collects, protecting against unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. California SB327 ->
US Cyber Trust Mark: Launched in January 2025, this initiative introduces a labeling program for consumer IoT products, indicating adherence to specific cybersecurity standards. Similar to the Energy Star program, the Cyber Trust Mark aims to help consumers identify secure devices. FCC Cyber Trust Mark
🇪🇺 European Union
Cyber Resilience Act (CRA): Proposed in September 2022, the CRA aims to establish common cybersecurity standards for products with digital elements, including IoT devices. The act emphasizes a "secure by design" approach, requiring manufacturers to assess cybersecurity risks, implement appropriate security measures, and provide ongoing support and updates. Full enforcement is anticipated by 2027, with some provisions taking effect earlier. European Commission CRA ->
🇬🇧 United Kingdom
Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) Bill: Introduced in December 2021, the PSTI Bill seeks to mandate cybersecurity requirements for IoT device manufacturers, importers, and distributors. Key provisions include banning default passwords, requiring transparency about the duration of security updates, and providing a public point of contact for vulnerability reporting. UK Legislation PSTI ->
🌍 International
ISO/IEC 27400: Part of the ISO/IEC 27000 family, this standard provides guidelines for IoT security and privacy, offering a framework for managing risks associated with IoT devices and ensuring data protection
IEC 62443: This series of standards focuses on industrial communication networks and systems security, providing a comprehensive framework to address and mitigate security vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems, which can be applied to IoT contexts.
Security by design isn’t optional, regulators are watching.
🧠 Final Thought: Trust Starts Small
When you trust the device brushing your teeth, you’re trusting firmware written by someone you’ll never meet.
Cybersecurity isn’t about paranoia—it’s about transparency, resilience, and building trust into every link of the chain.
Questions or comments? Debug ports open, always. 🪥💻